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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 05-1127
                        
JAMES M. HOGGARD, JR.,
                              Appellant
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-06027)
District Judge:  Honorable Jacob P. Hart
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 8, 2005
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
(Filed December 21, 2005)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant James M. Hoggard, Jr. (“Hoggard”) appeals an order from a Magistrate
 The Magistrate Judge conducted all proceedings in this case pursuant to the1
consent of both parties in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 73.
2
Judge denying him a new trial on damages.   Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §1
1291.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 9, 2003, Hoggard’s former home in Coatesville, Pennsylvania was
damaged in a fire.  The house had been sold in November 2002 at a sheriff’s sale based
on a foreclosure action.  Though he was no longer the property’s owner, Hoggard
maintained an insurance policy for the house with Allstate Insurance Company
(“Allstate”).  Allstate denied Hoggard coverage for damage on the grounds that he did not
own the house at the time of the fire and had failed to inform Allstate of the deed transfer. 
Hoggard claimed he was unaware of the sale of his home until Allstate informed him of it
during the investigation of the fire.  
Hoggard did not seek to recover for damage to the home itself, but rather for
damage to personal property within the home.  His Allstate policy provided $159,600
worth of contents’ coverage for items within the house.  Hoggard sought the full amount
of this limit; a jury awarded him $10,000.
DISCUSSION
I.  Challenge to the Jury Verdict.
Hoggard claims that the Magistrate Judge should have set aside the damage award
3because it was contrary to the evidence and a product of passion, prejudice, partiality or
corruption.  See Hyang v. Lynde, 820 A.2d 753, 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).  This Court
reviews the Magistrate Judge’s refusal to set aside an alleged inadequate jury verdict for
abuse of discretion.  See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438
(1996); Springfield Crusher, Inc. v. Transcontinental Insurance Co., 372 F.2d 125 (3d
Cir. 1967).
The Magistrate Judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Hoggard’s request for
an altered verdict or a new trial based on the inadequacy of the verdict.  Hoggard testified
that the value of the damaged contents in his home was $300,000.  However, a member of
Allstate’s Special Investigations Unit testified that many of the most valuable items for
which Hoggard sought to recover were not covered under the insurance policy.  Based on
this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the total value of Hoggard’s
property lost was significantly less than he claimed.
Moreover, the only evidence supporting Hoggard’s valuation of the property
damaged was his testimony.  Allstate undermined Hoggard’s credibility by introducing
evidence suggesting that, contrary to his claim that he first learned from Allstate that his
home had been sold at a sheriff’s sale, Hoggard was aware prior to the fire that he no
longer owned the house.  Hoggard hurt his own credibility by testifying that he forged his
wife’s signature on the check that Allstate gave him as an advance on his claim. 
Additionally, the jury may have been skeptical when Hoggard provided estimated values
For example, Hoggard testified that the fire destroyed a $20,000 Roman2
Byzantine mirror, $3,500 custom made drapes, $600 lamps, and $3,600 camel hair
furniture.  Pictures of these items were admitted into evidence, and the jury could have
concluded that Hoggard had overstated his estimates of their value.  
4
for only a few specific items, all of which it could have viewed as inflated, if not
outrageous.   “‘Credibility determinations are the unique province of a fact finder,’”2
Scully v. U.S. WATS, 238 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Dardovitch v. Haltzman,
190 F.3d 125, 140 (3d Cir. 1999)), and we believe that there were grounds for the jury not
to find Hoggard credible when he testified to the value of damage to his property.
II.  Jury Instructions.
This Court reviews decisions regarding jury instructions for abuse of discretion. 
Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515, 524 (3d Cir. 1996).  Hoggard
contends the Magistrate Judge made two errors with respect to the jury instructions.  
First, Hoggard challenges the Magistrate Judge decision not to charge the jury that
Hoggard was entitled under Pennsylvania law to testify to the value of the contents of his
home.  He argues that the failure to do so contributed to the inadequacy of the jury verdict. 
Yet, the Magistrate Judge permitted Hoggard to testify as to the value of his goods and
instructed the jury to consider all evidence and testimony related to the value of the items. 
It was unnecessary to provide a specific instruction to the jury that Hoggard’s testimony
was permissible evidence.
Second, Hoggard argues that the Magistrate Judge should have instructed the jury
5that, if successful, he would have been entitled to prejudgment interest.  The Magistrate
Judge declined, stating that it was his practice to reserve the issue of prejudgment interest
for a post-trial motion.  The question of whether to award prejudgment interest is often
addressed through post-trial motions.  See, e.g., Girard Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 524 F.Supp. 884, 887 (E.D.Pa. 1981) (noting that district judge considered
plaintiff’s post-trial motion for prejudgment interest after a jury trial).  Thus, the
Magistrate Judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to instruct the jury regarding
prejudgment interest.  
Finding no error, we will affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order
